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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
CIVIL PROCEDURE - THE EFFECT OF INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY
ON THE RIGHT TO CONTRIBUTION
Plaintiff, a passenger in an automobile driven by her hus-
band, was injured in a collision with a car driven by defendant.
In a suit for personal injuries by plaintiff-wife defendant sought
contribution from the husband, who had been found contribu-
torily negligent, and had been declared a co-tortfeasor in a prior
suit by the husband against the defendant. The husband filed
an exception of no right and no cause of action based on inter-
spousal immunity. The trial court sustained the exception, and
the court of appeal affirmed. On certiorari, the Supreme Court
reversed. Held, interspousal immunity is restricted to suits be-
tween spouses and is not available to bar contribution from plain-
tiff's husband, who had been found to be a joint tortfeasor.
Smith v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 247 La. 695, 174
So. 2d 122 (La. 1965).
In the instant case, the contributory negligence of the hus-
band would properly give rise to two separate causes of action.
First, he would be liable to his wife for the injuries she sus-
tained through his fault;1 however, the judicial enforcement of
this substantive right is barred by R.S. 9:291, which prohibits
a wife from suing her husband for his torts.2 Second, the negli-
gent husband would also be liable to his co-tortfeasor under Civil
Code articles 2324 and 2103. The former provides that one who
assists another in the commission of an unlawful act is answer-
able in solido with that person,3 and the jurisprudence has con-
sistently held that joint tortfeasors are liable in solido.4 Article
2103 gives an obligor the right to enforce contribution against
1. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2315 (1870) : "Every act whatever of man that causes
damage to another, obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it ...."
2. LA. R.S. 9:291 (Supp. 1963) : "As long as the marriage continues and the
spouses are not separated judicially a married woman may not sue her husband
except for:
"(1) A separation of property;
"(2) The restitution and enjoyment of her paraphernal property;
"(3) A separation from bed and board; or
"(4) A divorce."
3. LA. CIviL CODE art. 2324 (1870) : "He who causes another person to do an
unlawful act, or assists or encourages in the commission of it, is answerable,
in solido, with that person, for the damage caused by such act."
4. See Cust v. Item Co., 200 La. 515, 8 So. 2d 361 (1942) ; Reid v. Lowden,
192 La. 811, 189 So. 286 (1939) ; Jones v. Maestri, 170 La. 290, 127 So. 631
(1930) ; Johnson v. Legeai, 147 La. 92, 84 So. 505 (1920) ; Williams v. Pelican
Creamery, 30 So. 2d 574 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1947) ; Grigsby v. Morgan & Lindsey,
148 So. 506 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1933).
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his solidary obligors 5 and since co-tortfeasors are solidary obli-
gors, each can enforce contribution against the other.6
Although it is clear that the law recognizes both interspousal
immunity and the right to contribution between joint tort-
feasors, the result is unclear when these two principles conflict.
The husband clearly has an immunity from suit by his wife, but
it is equally well established that a solidary obligor has a right
to contribution from his co-debtor in solido. The problem is to
determine which of these rules is to be enforced.
In the instant case the majority chose to enforce the right
to contribution, reasoning that the substantive right of a joint
tortfeasor, created by article 2103, should not be barred by
procedural immunity existing between spouses.7 The court rea-
soned that the application of the immunity statute should be
limited to suits between spouses and that, since the wife need
not be joined in the suit," the statute was inapplicable.
Basing its argument on two Louisiana decisions,9 the dis-
sent took the position that contribution should not be allowed.
These supporting cases involved situations where an injured
child brought suit against the defendant who sought to enforce
contribution against the negligent parent. Contribution was de-
5. L&. CIVIL CODE art. 2103 (1870) : "When two or more debtors are liable
in solido, whether the obligation arises from a contract, a quasi contract, an
offense, or a quasi offense, it should be divided between them. As between the
solidary debtors, each is liable only for his virile portion of the obligation.
"A defendant who is sued on an obligation which, if it exists, is solidary may
seek to enforce contribution, if he is cast, against his solidary co-debtor by making
him a third party defendant in the suit, as provided in Article 1111 through 1116
of the Code of Civil Procedure, whether or not .the third party defendant was sued
by the plaintiff initially, and whether the defendant seeking to enforce contribu-
tion if he is cast admits or denies liability on the obligation sued on by the
plaintiff."
6. See notes 3, 4, 5 supra.
7. For cases holding that a wife has a cause of action against her husband
but no right of action, see, e.g., Dumas v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,
241 La. 1096, 134 So. 2d 45 (1961) ; Edwards v. Royal Indemn. Co., 182 La. 171,
161 So. 191 (1935) ; Soirez v. Great American Ins. Co., 168 So. 2d 418 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1964); Gremillion v. Caffey, 71 So. 2d 670 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1954);
Addison v. Employees Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 64 So. 2d 484 (La. App. lst Cir.
1953).
8. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1113 (1960) : "A defendant who does
not bring in as a third party defendant a person who is liable to him for all or
part of the principal demand does not on that account lose his right or cause of
action against such person .... ." Manifest in article 1113 is the implication
that the defendant could sue the third person separately to enforce his right.
9. See Rouley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 235 F. Supp. 786 (W.D.
La. 1964) ; Johnson v. Housing Authority of New Orleans, 163 So. 2d 569 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1964).
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nied in both cases under R.S. 9:571,10 which prohibits a child
from suing his parents during their marriage. These courts con-
cluded that a tortfeasor's right should be no greater than that of
his victim; and, since the victim could not sue the parent, the
tortfeasor could not. The dissent also pointed out that a majority
of other jurisdictions deny contribution under facts similar to
those of the instant case.
If a wife is allowed to sue her husband for his torts, there is
little doubt that this would adversely affect their marriage. The
underlying principle behind the immunity statute is to preserve
domestic tranquility, and to allow suit by the wife would con-
stitute a violation of this principle. The problem arises when
suit is brought not by the wife but by a third party. The court
in the instant case allowed recovery, and the decision seems
valid because personal conflict between husband and wife was
avoided. Furthermore, the husband committed a wrongful act;
and to let him escape the consequences, while at the same time
compelling someone else to pay his share, is inequitable. It seems
that a person's status as husband should affect only rights be-
tween spouses and should not adversely affect rights of third
parties; hence, the defendant's right to contribution should not
be limited by reason of the husband's immunity from suit by
his wife.
The instant decision could indicate a trend to limit the ap-
plicability of the interspousal immunity doctrine; such a pattern
seems to be emerging in other jurisdictions." It is submitted
that similar reasoning should cover situations in which contribu-
tion is sought against the parent of an injured child. In light
of this decision careful consideration should be given to the ques-
tion whether parent and child immunity will bar contribution,
even though such immunity has not been clearly established as
merely a procedural bar. It would seem that the personal rela-
tionship betwen parent and child would be the primary con-
sideration in the application of such immunity and that, there-
10. LA. R.S. 9:571 (Supp. 1963) : "The child who is not emancipated cannot
sue:
"(1) Either parent during the continuance of their marriage, when the parents
are not judicially separated; or
"(2) The parent who is entitled to his custody and control, when the marriage
of the parents is dissolved, or the parents are judicially separated."
11. See, e.g., Bedell v. Reagan, 159 Me. 292, 192 A.2d 24 (1963) ; Puller v.
Puller, 380 Pa. 219, 110 A.2d 175 (1955).
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fore, as in the case of interspousal immunity, the statute should
act only as a procedural bar.
Cary G. deBessonet
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - STATE TAXATION OF
GROSS RECEIPTS
General Motors (GM), a Delaware corporation, manufac-
tured automobiles and parts entirely outside the State of Wash-
ington and sold them at wholesale to dealers within the state.
The corporation's business was conducted through the Chevrolet,
Pontiac, and Oldsmobile automotive divisions and GM Parts
division. These divisions, although not separately incorporated,
operated independently of each other. All the Washington sales
business of the automotive divisions was conducted under the
general supervision of the western "zone offices" located at
Portland, Oregon. In the case of the Pontiac and Oldsmobile
divisions, the instate Washington Sales organization consisted
of representatives ("district managers") who provided the direct
contact with the dealers. Each district manager participated
in the selection of dealers in his district and assisted the dealers
in working out their sales programs. No offices were main-
tained for the district managers; each one worked out of his own
home and made frequent visits to the dealers in his district.
The Chevrolet sales organization was similar except that a
"branch office" was maintained at Seattle out of which a
majority of the Chevrolet representatives operated: this office
was also under the Portland zone office. All orders for auto-
mobiles were sent directly to the Portland offices where they
were accepted for shipment f.o.b. the factories, none of which
were in Oregon or Washington. The General Motors Parts
Division supplied dealers with parts of Chevrolet, Pontiac, and
Oldsmobile automobiles. For this purpose, warehouses were
maintained in iSeattle and Portland, the more commonly used
parts being kept on hand at the Seattle warehouse. No parts
division representatives visited dealers.
The State of Washington imposed a gross receipts tax "for
the act or privilege of engaging in business activities" within
the state.' Among the businesses taxed were manufacturing and
1. WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. 82.04.220 (1962): "There is levied and shall be
collected from every person a tax for the act or privilege of engaging in business
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